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PROOF AND EVALUATION OF PAIN
AND SUFFERING IN PERSONAL
INJURY LITIGATION
JACK H. OLENDER*
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE "pain and suffering" are well-
recognized elements of damages in personal injury actions.' Medical
science in its present state of development offers considerable aid in
determining existence of pain resulting from personal injury and in
predicting probabilities of future pain. Unfortunately, it is less helpful
in establishing the severity of pain and suffering with much precision.
Therefore, as would be expected, the problem of evaluating pain and
suffering is a difficult one for juries. The current split of authority on
the propriety of plaintiff's counsel utilizing mathematical formulae for
evaluating pain and suffering in argument before the jury is a result of
these inherent difficulties in evaluation of pain.
In this article, first the legal theories for evaluating pain and suffer-
ing are considered. Then, the nature of pain and methods for its
measurement are discussed. Next, the methods of proving pain and
suffering are examined, and last, pain and suffering as an element of
damages is evaluated.
I.
WHAT IS PAIN AND SUFFRING "WORTH"?
The fact-finder determines what pain and suffering is worth, or,
* A.B. 1957, LL.B. 596o, University of Pittsburgh; LL.M. i96i, George Washing-
ton University. Member of the District of Columbia Bar. This article is based on a
thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the LL.M. degree requirements at the George
Washington University School of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful
guidance of Professor J. Forrester Davison.
' Recovery for past pain and suffering is also allowed in survival actions. Although
the statutes vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, survival acts generally allow the
estate to recover for the pain and suffering of the deceased along with other damages
the deceased could have recovered had he lived. For a comparison of survival acts with
wrongful death acts (which generally do not make pain and suffering compensable), see
PROSSER, ToRTs § zos (2d ed. 1955).
Workmen's compensation, as an attempt to compensate disabled workmen for their
disabilities, is aimed at pecuniary loss, and so direct recovery for pain and suffering is
not part of the awards. i LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 7.4o, at so 0952).
However, many tests for impairment (the medical basis for disability) utilize the prin-
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more correctly, what will compensate the plaintiff for his pain and
suffering.2 There is a split of authority as to whether counsel may aid
the jury by suggesting the use of a mathematical formula in the compu-
tation of damages.' The cases indicate that the jury, either with or with-
out aid of the mathematical formula, is kept within some limits by the
appellate courts.
A. Mathematical Formula
The current controversy over plaintiff's counsel's use of a mathemati-
cal formula for damages in his argument to the jury deserves more than
passing notice, for the nature of pain and suffering is at the heart of the
controversy. By this method, the recovery desired for pain and suffer-
ing is represented by a per diem dollar amount for past pain and
suffering multiplied by the number of days from injury to trial and by
a per diem dollar amount for future pain and suffering multiplied by
the plaintiff's life or pain expectancy. 4 One of the method's ablest
advocates, Melvin M. Belli, utilizes a blackboard in making the per
diem argument,5 as do many others.6  However, other visual devices,
as well as purely oral argument, can serve as media for conveying the
per diem idea.
In a much-cited 1958 New Jersey case, Botta v. Brunner,' a new
trial was granted on the question of damages because plaintiff's counsel
ciple that movement and use are effectively restricted when painful; thus, the proof of
pain can be important in workmen's compensation cases.
' "Compensation" is all the plaintiff is entitled to. McCoRMICx, DAMAGES §§ 20,
137 (x935). The court, in its instructions to the jury, must convey this idea of compen-
sation. In refusing to reverse judgment for plaintiff on the ground that a charge to "see
what you think the pain and suffering . . . are worth" was incorrect, a Pennsylvania
court said: "Though 'compensation' is an approved word in instructions in cases of this
kind, it is not an infallible guide to a just verdict. . . . it is a matter of observation
that few philologists get on juries. We believe that only a philologist would appreciate
the difference between the word 'compensation' and the word 'price' or 'worth' as used
in instructions to be considered by juries in assessing damages for the elements referred
to." Herb v. Hallowell, 304 Pa. 128, 134-35, 154 Atl. S82, 584-85 (193).
'See Annot., 6o A.L.R.2d 1347 (1958). Among the many articles on the subject,
good case analyses are found in xo KAN. L. REv. 93 (96x); xa RUTGEs L. REV. 522
(1958); 14 U. FLA. L. REV. x89 (196i); 28 U. CINc. L. REv. 138 (1959).
' Even in the absence of per diem argument, mortality tables have been held relevant
"to the length of time she would carry the injury and endure the pain" and, thus, ad-
missible. Barone v. Forgette, 286 App. Div. 588, 146 N.Y.S.2d 63 (x955).
a x BELLI, MODERN TRiArs 846-9±8 (1954).
'E.g., Henne v. Balick, Si Del. 369, 146 A.2d 394 (1958).
26 N.J. 82, 138 A.±d 713 (1958). For a recent case disapproving of the so-
called "mathematical formula argument" but nevertheless upholding it, see Hall v.
Booth, 178 N.E.2d 6x9 (Ohio App. t96x).
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had used the mathematical formula in his argument to the jury. The
court reasoned that pain and suffering damages are of such a nebulous
nature that "the law has declared the standard for measuring damages
for personal injuries to be reasonable compensation and has entrusted
the administration of this criterion to the impartial conscience and judg-
ment of jurors .... .", The per diem figures were thought to "have no
foundation in the evidence. They import into the trial elements of
sheer speculation on a matter which by universal understanding is not
susceptible of evaluation on any such basis."" The court further rea-
soned that the defendants would be prejudiced if the per diem mathe-
matical formula were allowed, since they would be under pressure to
submit per diem rates of their own to contest the plaintiff's rates. Thus,
the defendants would be forced to acknowledge before the jury the
proposition that the law recognizes pain and suffering as capable of
evaluation on such a basis.10
New Jersey seems to have retreated from this position to some
extent. A later case permitted the listing on a blackboard, along with
other claimed damages, of the number of days since the accident and the
life expectancy of the plaintiff under the category "pain and suffering."'"
Thus, even though dollar amounts were not filled in, it would seem that
the per diem idea was conveyed to the jury.12 If it is conceded that the
time element is a factor, it seems inconsistent with such concession to
forbid counsel to suggest a dollar rate. Counsel is ordinarily permitted
to suggest to the jury all reasonable inferences that it may make from
the evidence so long as it is made dear that the argument of counsel is
not evidence. 13 Similarly, plaintiff's counsel should be permitted to
8 Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. $2, 94, 138 A.2d 713, 719 (1958).
'Id. at oo, 138 A.2d at 723.
"Id. at ox, 138 A.2d at 723-24.
"' Cross v. Robert E. Lamb, Inc., 6o N.J. Super. 53, x58 A.zd 359, certification
denied, 3 N.J. 35o, x6o A.2d 847 (596o). One writer suggests that plaintiff's coun-
sel should be allowed to recommend a method for measuring pain and suffering but
forbidden to make any reference to monetary figures to be used in the system. It is
said that this method "would leave entirely to the jury the estimation of those damages
which cannot be measured by any standard of pecuniary value." Comment, .4rgument
of Counsel-The Measure of Damages for Pain and Suffering, I5 U. MIAMI L. REV.
8S, 94 (596o).
"' However, the court said that the listing did not connote to the jury that it should
first determine a rate and then multiply by the time element. Cross v. Robert E. Lamb,
Inc., 6o N.J. Super. 53, 76, x58 A.2d 359, 372 (596o).
"Jones v. Hogan, S6 Wash. 2d 23, 355 P.2d 53 (196o). The mathematical
formula and blackboard technique were approved in this case, with the court noting that
suficient mentality to distinguish between argument and evidence must be attributed
[Vol. z962: 344
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suggest the correct dollar inference, leaving defendant's counsel free to
counteract such statements with suggestions of his own.14
Although the legal reason for prohibiting use of the mathematical
formula may be the ease with which it can be confused with evidence, 5
the defendant's major reason for opposing it is its tendency to inflate
the award. 16 When the formula is used, the jury is encouraged to
think of the pain and suffering as a day-to-day burden, and while
ioo,ooo dollars may seem a fantastic sum to award for pain and suffer-
ing, ten dollars per day may seem hardly enough. A Texas court
recognized that the per diem system is likely to result in higher verdicts
than "by guess and by golly" selection of a total pain and suffering
amount, but regarded the per diem method "more reasonable and
accurate," especially when "the evidence establishes both the period and
evidence from which an average daily degree of pain might be inferred,
together with a value thereof. 1
7
In others cases rejecting the Botta v. Brunner view, the difficulty in
evaluating pain and suffering has been given as a reason for allowing
counsel to suggest proper inferences to the jury.' That the per diem
method may be helpful to fact-finders other than reputedly impres-
sionable lay jurors is indicated by an admiralty case in which the judge,
to the jury. "This is especially true after the court has instructed that any remark of
counsel not sustained by the evidence should be disregarded." Id. at 32, 351 P.zd at
'59.1, It has been held permissible for plaintiff's counsel to invite defendant's counsel to
change the figures to what he thinks they should be. Roberts Const. Co. v. Henry, 265
Ala. 6o8, 6x6, 93 So.2d 498, 505 (1957). However, too much dignity must not be
afforded the blackboard figures; they must remain adjuncts to argument; for example,
the photographing of the blackboard in the jury's presence was held improper in that
it would overly impress the jury with the importance of the blackboard figures. Affett
v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., ii Wis. 2d 604, 614, xo6 N.W.2d 274, zo
(196o).
"
5The Botta v. Brunner court considered mathematical formula suggestions as
"argument, which in effect becomes testimony.? Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 100,
138 A.2d 713, 723 (x958). The Delaware court equates such argument with evidence:
"Plaintiff was permitted by means of blackboard a demonstration . . . to put in the
record evidence which he would not otherwise be permitted to introduce." Henne v.
Balick, 5z Del. 369, 376, 146 A.2d 394, 398 (.958).
"The University of Chicago jury project data, however, is said to indicate that the
jury takes a "gestalt" rather than item-by-item approach to damages. Kalven, The
Jury, The Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 29 Omo ST. L.J. 158, 161
(1958).
"" Continental Bus System, Inc. v. Toombs, 325 S.W.zd I53, x65 (Tex. Civ. App.
2959). Just what the value implied by the evidence was, is not dear.
"E.g., Ratner v. Arrington, xxi So. 2d 82 (Fla. App. 1959).
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sitting as fact-finder, used the per diem mathematical formula to com-
pute pain and suffering damages.19
Since "reasonable compensation" is the criterion for pain and suf-
fering awards, it would not seem that awards should be reduced to
present worth. The award is not the money equivalent of the right to
be free from pain, as it is for loss of earnings, so it should not be dis-
counted. Most of the cases have so held,20 but some require reduction
to present worth. 21 The strongest argument for reduction to present
worth can be made when the mathematical formula is used, for it seems
somewhat less illogical to discount a sum arrived at by a more precise
method than by the "by guess and by golly" method.22
A problem related to the use of the mathematical formula is that
concerning the ad damnum clause. The New Jersey court adopted the
Pennsylvania rule which does not allow the jury to learn the total
amount being sued for.23 The court in Botta v. Brunner stated that
even though the court admonishes the jury that the ad damnum clause
represents only the plaintiff's claim and that their award must be based
on the principle of reasonable compensation, "it is extremely doubtful
whether such admonitions are suffcient to eliminate the figure from
their minds as a conscious or unconscious factor in reaching their
verdict."24
It is suggested here that both the ad damnum clause and the per
diem mathematical formula are properly presented to the jury. Pos-
" Imperial Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. x956).
"E.g., Yost v. West Penn. Ry., 336 Pa. 407, 40o, 9 A.2d 368, 370 (1939); see
Annot., 154 A.L.R. 796, 8o (x945).
" E.g., Johnson v. Lewis, z5x N.C. 797, 804, ixa S.E.zd 512, 57 (596o).
"In Braddock v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., So So. 2d 66z, 668 (Fla. x9SS), a case
in which the mathematical formula was used, the court disapproved of reduction to
present worth.
""Stassun v. Chapin, 234 Pa. 1z, t88 At. itz (2936).
" Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 104, 138 A.2d 713, 725 (t958). The ad damnum
clause has been judicially criticized "as the equivalent of the asking price . . . inserted
in the complaint before any evidence is in the record." Affett v. Milwaukee & Suburban
Transp. Corp., 11 Wis. 2d 604, 614, 2o6 N.W.,d 274, 280 (ig6o). One writer says
the ad damnum clause "has been adopted . . . by plaintiffs as a psychological weapon
to get the jury in the swing of big figures. It starts off as a slow beat of the music
which finally ends in a war dance. It is fantasy which an attorney sometimes makes
real with the aid of a piece of chalk and a blackboard." Bradford, How to Talk
Dollars and Cents to the Jury, 1959 INs. L.J. 567, 569. The results of a questionnaire
published in the Bradford article indicate that in most jurisdictions specified amounts are
demanded ini the pleadings (47-2) i the jury is informed of the amount claimed (by the
court 39-7; by plaintiff's attoriey 3x-s); and the plaintiff's attorney is permitted to
advise the jury of his evaluation of pain and suffering (42-3). Id. at 570.
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sibly, the unenunciated reasons for excluding them are the thought that
pain and suffering should not be compensable or, if so, only to a limited
degree, or that the lay jury is not competent to evaluate conflicting facts
and theories in making an award. If any of these suggested reasons has
validity, the solution is not in withholding problem-solving ideas from
the jury, but in attacking the problems more directly and less hypocriti-
cally. Effectuation of the second suggested reason for prohibiting the
per diem argument, that of limiting recovery for pain and suffering, is
frequently brought about through the powers of appellate courts to set
aside excessive verdicts.
B. Standards
It might ... be said that it is fruitless to search for any norm to measure
compensation for intangible painful consequences of a wrongful injury. On
the other hand there must be a norm, otherwise how can the rule state that
a verdict may not be set aside as excessive unless it be "wholly unwarranted,"
"palpably excessive" and so on. The very words used in the rule presuppose
a norm. There is no evidence upon which the jury can decide because there
is no evidence in any record itself which tells the jury how to go about deciding
how much to allow for intangibles and therefore the range of the verdict
would be limitless. But everyone admits there must be a limit . . . . The
test is limited to the question of the fairess of the award for the in-
tangibles.... 25
The above statement describes the situation about as well as possible;
there is no standard other than "fairness," etc. The "golden rule" cri-
teria--"what would you take for this condition?"--is improper.26 The
award for pain and suffering is to be determined by the jury and its
verdict will not be interfered with so long as it constitutes a reasonable
judgment 2 7  Where the verdict is excessive, a remittitur will usually
be ordered on penalty of having the judgment reversed and a new trial
ordered.28  Where the verdict is not only excessive but also the result
of passion and prejudice a new trial will be ordered, since it is difficult
or impossible in such case to determine what part, if any, of the award
"Justice Kilcy, specially concurring in Goertz v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., x9 Ill. App.
2d a6x, 275-76, 153 N.E.2d 486, 494 (1958).
"Red Top Cab Co. v. Capps, 270 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
"Margaret Ann Super Markets v. Scholl, 159 Fla. 748, 754, 34 So. 2d 238, 241
2" "There was no indication that the verdict was the result of passion -or prejudice."
Lcinbach v. Pickwick Greyhound Lines, 138 Kan. 5o, 69, 23 P.2d 449, 458 (1933).
17--T . -t ..... 1 T A T LT A r'r Y']" y9 3" Ti Tt'*
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should be allowed to stand." The degree of excessiveness appears to
be the distinction between a verdict that is merely excessive and one
that is the result of passion and prejudice.30 In the converse situation,
where the award is insufficient, the appellate courts generally do not
award an additur for unliquidated damages such as pain and suffering. 1
But where no damages are given by the jury for pain and suffering and
the evidence dearly establishes pain and suffering, a new trial may be
ordered.32
Although the standard is "reasonableness" or "fairness," certain
criteria have been used by the courts in determining whether an award
is excessive. In the case quoted at length at the beginning of this sub-
section, the court reduced a 300,0o0 dollar award to 2ooo,0oo dollars.
Both legs and the left arm of the plaintiff had been amputated as a
result of the defendant's negligence. A concurring justice calculated
the juryis award as giving seventy per cent of the total award for the
element of pain and suffering as compared with an average allowance
of about forty per cent in "relevant Illinois cases."133  He compared the
awards in light of plaintiff's life expectancy and the life expectancies
in these "relevant Illinois cases" and concluded that plaintiff would be
receiving more per year for pain and suffering than previous plaintiffs
had received. 34 Such analysis presupposes that the prior awards are
relevant; that is, that the prior awards represent the upper limit of
"9 Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault St. Marie Ry. v. Moquin, 283 U.S. 520, 52z
0930.
30 Compare the two Leinbach cases. In the first, 135 Kan. 40, io P.2d 33 (1932),
a new trial was ordered since the $62,xoo verdict for the "severely, variously and pain-
fully injured" plaintiff (id. at 43, 56, 10 P.2d at 35, 41) was considered as having
"manifestly been given under passion and prejudice." (Id. at 57, 1o P.zd at 42). In
handling the appeal of the second trial, the court reduced the $27,000 personal injury
verdict to $zo,ooo. 138 Kan. 50, 23 P.2d 449 (x933).
8 See Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 21 3 (1957).
3 McCaslin v. Ellsworth Coal Co., t 9 Kan. 93, 237 Pac. 658 (1925); Carter v.
Skelly Oil Co., 317 S.W.zd 227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
"2 Goertz v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., x9 Ill. App. 2d 261, 277, 153 N.E.2d 4.86, 494
(1958). A year later, in Lau v. West Towns Bus Co., x6 Ill. 2d 442, tS8 N.E.2d
63 (1959), the fact that only $1,5oo of a $75,000 award was for special damages did
not render the award excessive, for "we cannot limit compensable damages for pain
and suffering to a set percentage of medical, hospital and kindred expenses. Costly
surgery may result in complete recovery for one person, while the total of the foregoing
expenses incurred by a multiple amputee may be small." Id. at 453, 158 N.E.2d at
69. See also Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mattingly, 339 S.W.2d 15S, z6o-6r (Ky.
1960).
"Goertz v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 19 Ill. App. 2d 261, 275, 153 N.E.2d, 486, 494.
(958).
"11 , 'IP T TP 11 A "11" IFF T f' "1 T 1 1 "11, t" ,G /- I'trl r .....
Vol. 96z' 344] PAIN AND SUFFERING 351
what should be awarded in a case of the same general nature. Although
courts which compare verdictsO5 make allowance for the decreasing pur-
chasing power of the dollar in their comparisons,"' again, it must be
assumed that the earlier cases were at the time of decision correct state-
ments of the maximum award that should have been allowed.
A defendant-minded court enunciated the idea that is apparently
behind the reduction of awards; that is, concern for the economic burden
of the defendant. After stating that the defendant bus company could
not make enough profit to pay the verdict of 62,Ioo dollars with a
round-trip to the moon, the court observed:
[T] his court has had to deal with many cases of severely and permanently
injured persons, and hitherto it has steadfastly set its face against the perver-
sion of a cause of action for personal injuries into a letter of marque to plunder
the treasury of a corporation. 3'
More recently it has been observed that changing social and economic
concepts are influencing courts and juries to place higher values on the
rights of human beings to remain free of bodily injury-"
Some commentators view disparities in awards for identical injuries
as undesirable and would welcome a "scientifically well-founded method
of making reasonable appraisal of the damages.1139  Are attempts at
standardization of damages for pain and suffering desirable? In an-
swering this question, pain and suffering should be placed in perspective
as part of the compensable aftermath of the traumatic event. The other
parts of the compensable aftermath are more purely pecuniary-medical
expenses, etc., and loss of income through disability. These differ, of
course, from individual to individual in direct proportion to the quantity
and quality of treatment given and to the diminution of earning capacity.
For example, a plaintiff earning iooooo dollars per year prior to an
accident who has had his earning potential cut to 50,ooo dollars per year
will be awarded more for loss of future earnings than will a 4,000
dollars per year man, with the same life expectancy, cut to 2,000 dol-
See Catalano, Negligence Law: The Theory of Comparable Verdicts, 4s C.B.A.J.
8IX (x959).
"' Sandifer Oil Co. v. Dew, 2±0 Miss. 6o9, 625-26, 71 So. zd 752, 755-56 (.954);
Texas & N.O. Ry. v. Coogler, 209 S.W.zd 778 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
" Leinbach v. Pickwick Greyhound Lines, 135 Kan. 4o, 56, x9 P.zd 33, 41 (193±).
See note 30 su ra.
Karlin, Bodily Injury Awards-Where Are We Going?, 1957 INs. L.J. 568, 570.
Prager, Computation of Damages in Personal Injury, 4 KAN. L. Ray. 91 (x955).
See also Zelermeyer, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 6 SYRAcusE L. Ray. 27, 41-42
(x954).
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lars. It is accepted that primarily pecuniary injuries should be com-
pensated for in accordance with the particular facts; that is, the award
should vary from person to person in direct proportion to actual pe-
cuniary loss. Likewise, the non-pecuniary elements, those for pain and
suffering, should be geared to meet the individual case.
So long as pain and suffering is compensable, judicial notice should
be taken of what is becoming common knowledge--different individuals
react differently, both physically and emotionally, to similar sets of
events. A blow which inflicts only an inconsequential bruise on one
person may trigger in another a painful syndrome which makes his life
burdensome. The tortfeasor's liability for the non-pecuniary effects
on his victim's life should not be restricted by arbitrary standards in
conflict with the principle that the tortfeasor must take his victim as he
finds him. The concept of individual differences is recognized by those
courts which consider the age, health, habits and pursuits of the plain-
tiff relevant to the size of his award.'
The differences in individual responses which necessitate individual
treatment of damages are discussed in the next section.
II.
THE NATURE OF PAIN
A. Can We Measure Pain?
If science can unequivocally answer "yes" to this question, some
changes in personal injury litigation can be predicted. The courts pro-
scribing the use of a mathematical formula for pain and suffering will
have to re-examine their position. For example, the Botta v. Brunner
court said "there is no measure by which the amount of pain and suffer-
ing endured by a particular human can be calculated"' 1 and "no one has
ever argued that a witness, expert or otherwise, would be competent to
estimate pain on a per hour or per diem basis. '" '42 Methods of objectively
" Van Gordon v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 834, 835 (W.D. Mo. 1950); cf.
Sykes v. Brown, x56 Va. 881, z59 S.E. 2oz (1931). However, the plaintiff's standing
in life is not necessarily determinative of what his pain and suffering damages should
be. "The elements that enter into a judgment like this are so diverse that it often
requires more of humility than it does of law properly to assess them. The Judge who
overlooks the fact that the lineman, the yardman, the plumber and the cook are made of
the same common clay that he is, is not equipped to do so." Florida Power & Light
Co. v. Hargrove, x6o Fla. 405, 41o, 35 SO.2d 1, 3 (x948).
'"Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 93i 138 A.2d 713, 7x8 (:958).
"Id. at too, 138 A.2d at 723.
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measuring pain would invalidate the premise for denying the mathe-
matical formula. Probably of more importance, the proof and evalua-
tion of pain would be made relatively simple.
In this section, some of the work on pain will be noted in an attempt
to determine to what extent pain can be measured. Generally, it should
be said that in the context of personal injury litigation, pain cannot be
measured with any degree of accuracy approaching that possible in diag-
nosing a relatively uncomplicated fracture. But the present state of
medical science does offer some aids in the proof and evaluation of pain.
Before examining some of the methods of proving, measuring or evalu-
ating pain, the nature of pain as it is currently understood will be
considered.
B. Definition and Mechanics of Pain
Unless he is one of those rare and unfortunate individuals in whom
pain perception is congenitally absent,48 one can define pain introspec-
tively. No attempt will be made to define it here, for medical experts
admit that they do not know just what it is."4 Neither is it understood
exactly how the pain mechanism works.45 It may be said very generally
that pain impulses originate in nerve terminals throughout the body
and somehow are transmitted through various fibers and routes to re-
gions of the brain where they are perceived or "appreciated" and where
physical and mental reactions are initiated. 8
The common nervous headache is an example of the interaction of
the psyche or mental processes and physical or somatic processes in the
pain experience. It is believed that the perception of and reaction to
all types of pain is affected by the individual's history and personality
and the circumstances in which the noxious stimuli are encountered.47
"Such persons do not have the benefit of pain as a protective warning device.
The cause of this rare condition is unknown. STEINDLER, INTERPRETATION OF PAIN IN
ORTHOPEDIC PRACTICE 27-1S (1959).
" BEECHER, MEASUREMENT OF SUBJECTIVE RESPONSES: QuANTITATIvE EFFECTS
OF DRucs 7 (9S9 ).
""WHITE & SwEET, PAIN, ITS MECHANISMS AND NEUROLOGICAL CONTROL 66
(1955) ; Kelly, Does Pressure on Nerves Cause Pain?, i96o MED. J. AUSrL. i18 (No.1).
"WOLFF & WOLF, PAIN 5-8 (1958); MAcBRYDE, SIGNS AND SYMPTOMS 8- 9
(1952). Exactly how this works is not known. It would seem that we are a step
closer to understanding this mechanism because of the work of Columbia University
biochemists who studied the chemicals involved in the transmission of impulses through
nerves. Nachmansohn, Role of Acetylcholine in Axonal Conduction and Neuromuscular.
Transmission, 38 AMER. J. PHYs. MED. 190 (Oct. 1959).
"E.g., Melzack, The Perception of Pain, 204 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 41 (Feb.
Vol. 1967,: 344]
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One writer says that "all of these factors play a role in determining
actual patterns of nerve impulses ascending to the brain and traveling
within the brain itself.) 48
The idea that "for a given stimulus there must be a given response;
that is, for so much stimulation of pain endings, so much pain will be
experienced" is fundamental error.49 Dr. Beecher of Massachusetts
General Hospital says further that apparently pain is experienced "only
if an essential psychological state (anxiety, stress) is present. Physio-
logical derangement (stimulation of pain endings) is not enough. '5 0
To support this conclusion, Dr. Beecher compares his war experience
with wounded soldiers with a study of civilian surgical patients.51 Of
all the severely wounded soldiers considered in his observations, only
one-third, on being directly questioned shortly after entry into a forward
hospital, said their pain bothered them enough to require relief. In
contrast, of the male civilian patients who had undergone major surgery
with far less tissue trauma than the soldiers, four-fifths wanted medi-
cation to relieve their pain. The behavior of the soldiers cannot be
attributed to shock for they were mentally dear, and they did not have
total pain block, for they complained vigorously at inept venipuncture.
The explanation:
The important difference in the two groups seems to lie in their responses
to the wounds. In the wounded soldier it was relief, thankfulness for his escape
alive from the battlefield, even euphoria (his wound was a good thing); to
the civilian his major surgery, even though essential, was a depressing, calami-
tous event. The civilian group's pain was strikingly more frequent and more
severe than that of the soldiers. These data state in numerical terms what is
known to all thoughtful clinical observers: There is no simple, direct relation-
ship between the wound per se and the pain experienced. The pain is in very
large part determined by other factors, and of great importance here is the
significance of the wound, i.e., reaction to the wound.5"
Studies on the relief of pain also provide evidence that psychological
1961); Rome, The Problem of Pain, 3x STAFF MEETINGS OF THE MAYO CLINIC 221
(z956).
," See Melzack, supra note 47, at 49.
"BEECHER, op. cit. supra note 44, at x.
" Beecher, Increased Stress and Effectiveess of Placebos and "Actlive" Drug:, 132
SCIENCE 91-92 (196o).
' BEECHER, Op'. cit. supra note 44, at 164-65; Beecher, Relationship of Significance
of Wound to Pain Experience, z6 J.A.M.A. z6o9 (x956); Beecher, Pain in Men
Wounded in Battle, 123 AM. SURcERY 96 (z946).
"BEECHER, op. cit. supra note 44, at z 65.
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elements are important in pain syndromes. Small doses of morphine
have been found more effective in relieving post-operative pain than
larger doses have in altering experimental pain.3 The significant post-
operative pain was more amenable to treatment. From another study54
it can be further concluded that relief obtained in the stress situation,
i.e., post-operative pain, was attributable to suggestion as well as to the
analgesic properties of morphine. It was found that the placebo, an
inert agent, relieved forty per cent of a group of patients in great pain
whereas morphine relieved fifty-two per cent. The placebo, of course,
was not revealed as such. Later when the pain was much less, the inert
agent relieved twenty-six per cent and the morphine relieved eighty-nine
per cent. Thus, it appears that the power of suggestion 5 is greatest
when pain is greatest. It has likewise been shown that a placebo's
effectiveness increases as anxiety increases."" Since the placebos are
effective in dealing with severe pain and since they can affect only psy-
chological processes, it seems that stress and other psychological factors
are important components of severe pain.3 7 "The rigid dichotomy of
organic pain versus psychogenic pain has become obsolete, and pain must
be considered and approached clinically as a Gestalt problem.... .,18
In Beecher's studies utilizing these placebos, he found that there
is a group that consistently reacts to them.3 It will be recalled that
reaction to placebos is an indication that the patient's psyche is playing
a major role in his pain experience. Thus, it would appear that the
pain experience of the group of persons who are consistent reactors is
largely controlled by psychological factors 60  Beecher says that the
"Id. at 164. "Id. at 170.
r The power of a placebo has been likened to that of hypnotism. Id. at 185.
* Id. at 185.
"Beecher, supra note 5o, at 91.
Cooper & Braceland, Psychosomatic Aspects of Pain, 34 MED. CLINIcS No. AMER.
98! (1950). The article contains a diagram of a "pain spectrum" representing the
relative parts neurologic and psychiatric factors play in various pain syndromes in dif-
ferent individuals. At one-end is the pain of predominately physical origin and at the
other, that of the malingerer. By definition, a spectrum does not have sharp dividing
lines between different "categories." The individual pain case will fall more into one
particular area than into the other areas of the spectrum.
"' BEECHER, op. cit. supra note 44, at 68-69.
"Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the physical and mental set of the
consistent reactor predisposes him to relief of his pain. The difference between these
two statements of conclusion is, perhaps, semantic only, but the difference in psyche in
the -placebo reactors and non-reactors may be qualitative rather than quantitative; i.e.,
the psyche is important in all pain experience but is more obvious where the results
are not in accord with what would be expected absent the psychological elements.
Vol. igaz: 3441
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placebo reactor is identifiable by psychological testing and interviewing,
but, regrettably, he does not say what the specific traits of a reactor are
other than that there are significant differences between his "attitudes,
educational background, and personality structure" and those of a non-
reactor.61
Several studies using experimentally induced pain should be men-
tioned here."2 It is reported that "examination of i5o coal miners re-
vealed that over 75%0 were hyposensitive to pain.... These findings
suggest that a hazardous occupation over a period of years may be a
predisposing cause in raising a patient's threshold to pain .... I'll They
may also suggest, among other things, that men relatively insensitive
to pain enter into the mining occupation.
The results of another study indicate that (I) women are more
sensitive to pain than are men, (2) French-Canadians and Jews are more
sensitive to pain than Anglo-Saxons, and (3) pain sensitivity decreases
with age." This last finding is in accord with the belief that "sensi-
tivity is learned by the infant, increases to adult life, and then gradually
diminishes .... ,,15 Countering this reported tendency of elderly people
in the experimental situation, is the "facilitated pain" phenomenon.
As pain is continued over a period of time, resistance to conduction of
the impulses to the brain is reduced. This is probably the reason chronic
rheumatics are so sensitive as to be able to predict changes in the
weather.e"
Some individuals are reported to have a tendency to reduce per-
ceptions, including that of pain. In one experiment, the subjects were
blindfolded and instructed to continuously rub a block and then judge
"' Dr. Beecher does eliminate certain factors from relevancy: "It was clear that the
placebo reactors did not belong to the lunatic fringe of the population; they were
neither whiners nor notable incompetents, neither male nor female, neither young nor
old, predominately. Their average intelligence was the same as that of the non-reactors."
BEECHE, op. cit. supra note 44, at 69.
"' Experimentally induced pain is discussed in greater detail at note x 5 infra. The
results of the experiments now being discussed should be carefully evaluated in light of
the criticisms considered at notes xx6-8 infra. They are presented here, not necessarily
as an endorsement of their validity, but to give a sampling of the work and ideas in
this area.
Sherman, Sensitivity to Pain, 48 CAN. M.A.J. 437 (1943).
Sherman & Robillard, Sensitioity to Pain in the Aged, 83 CAN. M.A.J. 944-47
(960).
" MACBRYDE, op. cit. sipra note 46, at x6 (195z). "The learning process in re-





its size. Those who tended to subjectively reduce the block were found
to have a higher tolerance for experimentally induced pain than were
those who tended to subjectively enlarge the block. 7
Some courts have recognized individual differences in pain and
suffering cases, even though no references to the reported experiments
have been made." The recognition of these differences is based on
common knowledge. Should the results of the reported studies be
admitted into evidence in personal injury litigation to show that the
plaintiff, because he falls into certain categories, is either hyposensitive
or hypersensitive to pain? If they are, precautions must be taken: the
experiment must be proven valid, i.e., it must measure what it says it
measures; reliable, i.e., the method and controls used must be such that
the results are reproducible; and relevant. The differences between
experimentally induced pain and pathological pain experience cast doubt
on the relevancy of such datai this doubt is reinforced by the criticisms
of experimental pain techniques and theories69
C. Psychogenic Pain
Some current ideas on the psychology of the individual as affecting
his pain experience have been surveyed above. The idea was developed
that all pain experience has psychic elements. Pain syndromes where
the psychological elements are dramatically manifested will now be
examined. These are psychoneuroses and the pain can be called "psy-
chogenic."70 A traumatic pain neurosis is not the same thing as malin-
gering, which is a feigning of pain or disability on a conscious level,71
67 Petrie, Some Psychological A4spects of Pain and Relief of Suffering, 86 ANN. N.Y.
AcAD. Sc. 13 (March 196o ) ; Petrie, Collins & Soloman, The Tolerance for Pain and
Sensory Deprivation, 73 AMER. J. PSYCHOL. 8o (196o). SHELDON & STEVENS, THE
VARIETIES OF TEMPERAMENT (1942a), may be noted in passing. The authors assert
that persons with "somatotonic" tendencies (predominance of somatic structure-athletic
type) have "Spartan indifference to pain"; persons with "cerebrotonic tendencies (pre-
dominance of consciousness of higher centers of nervous system--tall, thin type) are
hypersensitive to pain; "viscerotonilc" types (predominance of digestive viscera-fat
people) are "complacent" about pain, while average individuals are more evenly
balanced.
"'Ware v. Garvey, 139 F. Supp. 71, 81 (D. Mass. 1956); Franklin v. United
States, 124 F. Supp. 953, 958 (N.D. W. Va. 1954) (Federal Tort Claims Act case);
Sandoval v. Southern California Enterprises, 98 Cal. App. 2d 240, 254-55, 219 P.2d
928, 938 (5950).
' See criticisms at notes ss6-18 infra.
"o Different authorities use different terminology for these concepts. The language
and the terms used here are typical and not exhaustive; the purpose is to convey some of
the basic ideas on pain.
" MacKay, Post-Traumatic Neuroses, 29 INDUSTRIAL MED. & SURGERY 200, 201
Vol. 1962: 3441
358 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. s9 62: 3 44.
and unlike malingering, it is compensable in personal injury actions.
The victim is more or less unaware of the psychic nature of his affliction.
The theory is that prior to the traumatic episode which triggered the
neurotic syndrome, the victim was neurotic to some degree.1 2
It may be that the psychogenic pain was originally organically in-
duced, but psychological factors are responsible for its perpetuation. 3
Furthermore, in some cases, the prolonged obsession with pain may
almost constitute the raison d'etre.74 That is, the attention of the trauma
victim may become intensely fixed on the site of the injury. His con-
cern is fed by attention from family, physicians and friends. Thus, the
pain site becomes the center of his universe. 5 As an attention-getter, it
affords satisfaction, so he becomes a martyr to pain.76  All of this is
on an unconscious level, so the pain is very real; the neurotic is not
malingering.
(196o). "The line between psychoneurosis and malingering is often difficult to draw.
It depends largely on how deliberately the deception is practiced. A malingerer knows
perfectly well that he is falsifying; a psychoneurotic patient is more or less unaware of
his motivation-it is unconsciously motivated to a much greater extent than is the cae
of the malingerer." WHIT & SWEET, op. cit. supra note 45, at 104. See Hood v.
Texas Indem. Ins. Co., 146 Tex. 522, 209 S.W.2d 345 (1948) (workmen's compensa-
tion); Solomon & Smith, Traumatic Neuroses in Court, 30 VA. L. REv. 87 (1943).
Perhaps the increasing popular awareness of mental illness will effect more and
larger awards for psychosomatic pain. "Television and other channels of education have
taught the public to accept mental illness diagnoses from competent psychiatrists. Amend
your pleadings as mon as you discover the real illness, and raise your prayer. You may
now have a substantial case, where you had a slight bruise before." Sindell, Medical-
Legal Preparation of a Tort Case, 1958 TRIAL AND TORT TRENDS 445, 473-74
(Belli ed.).
," MacKay, supra note 7I, at 202.
"' Cooper & Braceland, Psychosomatic Aspects of Pain, 34 MED. CLINIcS No. AMEL.
981, 986-87 (1950) ; WHITE & SWEET, op. cit. supra note 45, at 104. It is said that
the converse is not true. "It is almost unheard of for ... psychiatrists to see a patient
whose mental illness has been precipitated by an experience with physical pain. It just
doesn't produce psychiatric disability." Letter of April 19, 1961, from Dr. Herbert C.
Modlin of the Menninger Clinic, Topeka, Kansas. He also says: "We see so many
who bear up bravely to the severist pain with fortitude and without any permanent
psychological effects. Our patients rarely make much of it, and we are inclined to be
a bit puzzled by the few who seem to make a major issue of it."
For the effects of disability, a common concomitant of pain in the aftermath of
trauma, see PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF PHYSICAL DISABILITY (Garret 5952), Re-
habilitation Service Series No. zo, Federal Security Agency, Ofice of Vocational Re-
habilitation. See especially the articles at pages eighteen and eighty.
' Erasmus, Studies on Pain, 25 So. AFR. M.J. 6ox, 603 (951).
, It is a common experience that distraction at least makes the suffering of pain
more bearable. Indeed, there is evidence that it may cause variations in pain threshold
and pain sensitivity. BEECHER, op. cit. supra note 44, at 143, 155.
"Cooper & Braceland, supra note 73, at 986-87.
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The concept of "symbolic" or "referred" pain 1 describes the situa-
tion where the individual has received an injury more mental than
physical, such as an insulting slap on the face, and as a result experiences
physical pain that has little observable physical basis. The physical pain
becomes a symbol representing the mental hurt. 8 Perhaps "compensa-
tion neurosis" and "litigation neurosis" involve symbolic pain; that is,
the victim unconsciously feels that he has been taken advantage of and
is entitled to something.7
An interesting theory of psychosomatic pain has been developed
involving the "fight or flight" phenomenon."' The theory is that in-
jury or threat of injury arouses the "fight or flight" instincts-the
sympathetic division of the autonomic nervous system is activated and
the heart accelerates, air passages widen, sweat glands secrete, adrenalin
and sugar are released into the blood stream, etc."' However, since
modern man does not usually fight or flee in situations such as an auto-
mobile accident, the tremendous amounts of nervous impulses accumu-
lated in the body are not relieved and the physiological harmony of the
nervous system is disrupted. Consequently, one of the results may be
psychosomatic pain. 2
Mention should be made of one more pain sensation where non-
physical factors may be very important. The sensation known as "phan-
tom pain" sometimes follows amputation and is apparently localized
where the amputated part used to be. It is consistently reported that the
great majority of amputees experience this sensation of phantom pain,"
'"Waiters, Pain and Suffering, 36 MED. CLINICS No. Am.m 485-5oo (1951).
18 Since such pain may conform to psychologic rather than anatomical patterns, a
non-psyche oriented diagnostician may conclude: "malingerer." See discussion of tests
for pain and disability at note 83 infra.
'9 Gotten, Survey of One Hundred Cases of Whiplash Injury After Settlement of
Litigation, 162 J.A.M.A. 865 (x956), concludes on the basis of the study that since
most of the patients recovered after litigation was terminated, the pressure of litigation
accentuates complaint. Without disputing that conclusion, it is suggested that time may
also contribute to the healing.
" Pain and Suffering in Psychosomatic Injuries, 5 CuP. MED. ATNmys. 13-19 (Sept.
1958).
" 'Deep pain" (internal, as opposed to "superficial pain" which is near the surface
of the body) may precipitate withdrawal activity rather than fight or flight preparation.
MACBRYDF, op. cit. supra note 46, at io (192).
8' Crawfis, Conversion Hysteria-An Explanation for Attorneys, 6 CLEV.-MAiL L.
REV. 31 (1957).
"BoNIcA, THE MANAGEMENT OF PAIN 980 (1953); Erasmus, Studies on Pain, 25
So. AP. M.J. 6os, 6o2 (x951) ; Henderson & Smyth, Phantom Limbs, xi J. NEUROL.,
NEUROSURc. AND PSYCHIAT. 88, xo6 (New Series 1948).
w. • "1
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but there are variations in the incidence of pain in the phantom re-
ported.8' Theories of the causes and mechanics of phantom pain range
from the predominately physical to the predominately mental.8 6 In
either event, however, phantom pain is compensable in personal injury
actions.8 6
D. Medical Techniques for Proving, Measuring, and Evaluating Pain
It should first be noted that search has disclosed no instances of
scientists working on a pain-measuring machine designed especially
for use in the court room. While machines and techniques which
measure or test pain are being developed and used, their adaptability at
this time for court room use is not apparent. Instead, these machines
and techniques were developed for the testing of drugs, diagnoses, and
psychological and sociological testing. Some of these more sophisticated
and novel techniques are considered in this section, along with the more
common methods for measuring and evaluating pain.
Some of the tests for distinguishing suffering from malingering are
very informal:
The facial expression of true pain-the pinched features, the pallor, the
clammy skin, the dilated pupils, the knotted brow-cannot be imitated by the
malingerer: these, with the intermittent involuntary cry or groan and the
characteristic writhing or bodily contortions, present an unmistakable picture
of suffering.B8
Other tests are more standardized. For example, Mannkopf's sign for
suddenly inflicted pain regards an increase in pulse rate of twenty-four
to forty-four beats per second as significant.88 Although MannkopPs
sign may not be helpful in proving continuous pain, it can be used to
S6 BONICA, op. cit. supra note 83 (ten per cent have pain and dysesthesia) ; Erasmus,
sutra note 83 (seldom painful); Henderson & Smyth, supra note 83 (the great ma-
jority are painless) i Melzack, The Perception of Pain, 204 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 41,
46 (Feb. 195) (thirty per cent have pain and five per cent have severe pain).
"s Walters, Pain and Suffering, MEDICAL CLINIcs No. AMER. 485, 492 (March
1952). Compare the statement of Dr. Modlin in note 73 supra, with this excerpt from
BONIcA, op. cit. supra note 83, 980: "The role of underlying psychoneurosis in the
etiology of post-amputation pain is difficult to evaluate as the pain and associated symp-
tomatology produced by an amputation are likely to bring out neurotic tendencies even
in stable individuals. I believe that the psychoneurotic manifestation is the result rather
than the cause of this disorder." Id. at 980.
Be Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, ISo F.zd 295, 303 (9th Cir. 195o); Hickenbottom
v. Delaware L. & W. Ry., 12z N.Y. 9!, 95-97, 25 N.E. 279, 279-80 (z89o).
s7 MACBRYDE, op. cit. supra note 46, at so-i x.
"a GRAY, ArrORNEY's TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE, § 1o2.11 (s960).
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show that manipulation and movement of an area is painful and use is
impaired."9 However, in some painful conditions, the pulse rate de-
creases. It is true with many of the body's systems that the reaction to
pain is dependent in large degree upon the type of pain-is it deep
pain, i.e., internal, or superficial pain, i.e., near the body surface? Gen-
erally, the "fight or flight" reactions are activated by superficial pain
and "withdrawal" reactions are activated by deep pain.9
Prolonged intense pain may affect the heart and thus alter the
T-wave of an electrocardiogram.91 The blood pressure may rise with
severe pain,9 2 although deep pain may cause it to drop.9  Generally, the
respiration rate, metabolic rate and temperature increase with pain 4
On the other hand, skin resistance to electricity in a superficial pain
area is decreased.95 A dermometer can be used to determine skin re-
sistance, and areas with low resistance can then be charted.'
Palpation, pin pricks and scratch tests are sometimes used in the
areas the patient says hurt him. By observing the patient's responses
to these irritations-wincing, groaning, voluntary complaint, reflex mus-
cle spasm-the physician can localize the pain and add to his under-
standing of its nature9  Muscle spasm, because of its involuntary
nature, is considered a good indication of pain. 8
Pain which impairs movement or is activated by movement can be
evaluated by observing attempts at movement and reaction to passive
movement. Recording devices can be used to measure joint mobility.9
When flexion of certain parts of the body produces pain, the involve-
ment of certain nerves is indicated. For example, Las~gue's sign for
sciatic pain is observed by raising the leg and increasing tension on the
sciatic nerve. If the sciatic nerve is injured or diseased, flexion of the
thigh is limited and is painful.100 As malingerers may be familiar with
'o See Schmidt v. Chicago City Ry., 239 Il. 494, Soo, 88 N.E. 275, 278 (1909).
*o See note 82 supra.





8 Id. at 694.-97.
Richter, Instructions for Using the Cutaneous Resistance Recorder, or "Der-
mometer" . . . . 3 J. NEUROSUEG. 1S1 (1946).
:1 BONICA, op. cit. supra note 83, at 682-83.
9 8 STEINDLER, INTERPRETATION OF PAIN IN ORTHOPEDIC PRACTICE zo (1959).
"STEINDLER, KINESIOLOGY OF THE HUMAN BODY UNDER NoRMAL AND PATHO-
LOGICAL CONDITIONS 117-18 (1955).
100 BoNICA, op. cit. supra note 83, at 751. The book contains charts listing the
Vol; 1962: 34*1'
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Lashgue's sign, a variation of it in which the patient takes a seated
rather than a supine position has been developed.101
In cases involving either malingering or psychosomatic pain, these
nerve involvement tests may produce unusual results in terms of entirely
anatomical and physiological factors. The localization or radiation of
the pain may not conform to anatomic patterns. 10 2  The pain patterns
may be psychologic rather than anatomic in the pain neurotic; i.e., the
entire area involved in the subject's traumatic episode may be painful
without regard to patterns of innervation.10 3  The non-professional
malingerer may be ignorant of the mechanical details of pain experience.
Consequently, movement tests, manipulations, or pin-prick tests, for
example, may often disclose these unusual pain patterns.10 4  Further-
more, observation of the patient's gait can be valuable to the experienced
eye, since different types of pain invite different distributions of weight
various signs, symptoms and tests for various painful conditions. See, for example, the
chart on backache and back pain, at 743-49. Traumatic back pain is considered at 745-
46.
101 The Beyerle-May sciatic tension test is discussed in Pruce, Clarke & Clime, Exag-
geration of Symptoms, Malingering and Conversion Reaction, 53 So. M.J. 885, 887
(196o). The authors also suggest other tests to aid the examining physician in trapping
malingerers: Dropped pants test--stiff back is found on examination, but agility in pull-
ing pants up, at 887; Two-table test-discreetly observe the patient as he goes on and off
the examination table, and then on and off the X-ray table. The patient who is simu-
lating stiffness of the back will often relax after completion of his physical examination
and functional ranges of motion are demonstrable as he gets on and off the X-ray
table, at 886-87. Along the same lines: "It is during the physical examination of the
malingerer that he can be fooled into making his fatal mistake. To expose the fraud,
it is necessary to confuse the patient. This may be accomplished by visual confusion with
mirrors, in reversed images and changed distances. If he can be distracted and confused
by doing more than one thing at a time, he will be led into making a mistake. He can
frequently be exposed by use of mental confusion, by asking and touching while the
patient cannot see." Cantor, Psychosomatic Injury, Traumatic Psychoneurolis, and
Law, 6 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 4z8, 436 (1957).
One of the co-authors of the article, Dr. Pruce, advised physicians at a meeting of
the American Board of Legal Medicine to avoid labelling patients "malingerer," since
this term implies a deliberate intent to deceive which is "difficult to confirm medically
and almost impossible to prove legally." He urged a formulation of opinion like this:
"After thoughtful and thorough examination the findings make it obvious that the
motor and sensory manifestations do not have any organic or structural basis and can
be explained only on the basis of conversion hysteria or malingering." 2 PHYSICIAN'S




MACBRYDE, SIGNS AND SYMPTOMS 153 (5952).
.. BONICA, op. cit. supra note 83,. at 675; Walters, Pain and Suffering, MED.
CLINICS No. AMER. 485, 495 (March x952).
104 Pruce, supra note io, at 890.
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and body movements which are difficult for the malingerer to consist-
ently imitate. 105
It has been pointed out that where the psyche plays a predominant
part in a pain experience, the pain may often be relieved by the power
of suggestion implicit in the administration of a placebo.106 However,
very frequently psychogenic pain is not influenced by factors that ordi-
narily intensify or relieve pain where the cause is primarily physical.107
These two phenomena are the basis for the saline-procaine test for de-
termining whether the cause of particular pain is primarily physical or
primarily psychic. If the saline does not relieve it, but the procaine, a
local anesthetic, does, it is primarily physical. When neither is effective,
a severe conversion syndrome or malingering is suspected. "It should
be stressed that though this test is clinically valuable, it does not consti-
tute a precise, specific reaction and at best can only serve as an aid to
clinical judgment in the evaluation of pain."'"" On the same theory, if
a small dose of an analgesic such as aspirin relieves "very severe" pain,
psychic factors are probably a large part of the problem.10 9 A record of
the pain-relievers administered to a patient can be useful to show, at
least, that he complained of pain.1" 0
Because the white blood cell count usually increases when infection
is present in the body, an increase is an indication that the patient is
probably undergoing pain produced by the infection. Another phe-
nomenon less closely related to pain occurs in the white blood cells
during stress situations, since stress reportedly produces changes in the
physical make-up of the cells."' Proof that the plaintiff has been sub-
ject to stress is of some relevance to his pain experience, as stress can
be described as a medical concept of mental pain and suffering."' It
would appear that the physical manifestation of stress in the white blood
cells is analogous to the "fight or flight" reactions of the sympathetic
'os STEINDLER, Op. Cit. supra note 98, at o-z; STEINDLER, op. cit. supra note 99,
at 667-83.
108 See discussion at notes 55-58 supra.
10? MACBRYDE, op. cit. supra note o, at 153.
108 BoNICA, op. cit. supra note 83, at 684.
10' id. at 685.
1o See discussion of pain relievers at note iSS infra.
"' Wasmuth, Medical Evaluation of Mental Pain and Suffering, 6 CLEV.-MAR. L.
REV. 7, 13-15 (1957).
S.. ELYE, THE STRESS op LiFE (x956). When the body is subject to stress the
tissues are affected (alarm reaction); the affected tissues transmit "messages" which
induce a stage of resistance. When a person is already under stress and his resistance is
low, additional stress may cause exhaustion.
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division of the autonomic nervous system. Perhaps with an increase
in emphasis on mental suffering in personal injury litigation, stress tests
will become of great interest to the personal injury bar.
On the basis of work such as that with blood cells, it has been opti-
mistically predicted that:
[T]he sciences ultimately will satisfy the requirements of the law with an
objective, easily performed and readily available method, to evaluate the
human emotions accurately. Such a yardstick will enable the court to assess
accurately the damages by mental and emotional disturbance and put it in a
position to render to the injured person the full measure of justice to which
he is entitled." 3
Hardy, Wolff and Goodell's device for experimentally inducing
pain, the dolorimeter, apparently has met with varied success, depending
upon who the commentator is. With the dolorimeter," 4 light and heat
is focused on small areas of blackened skin of the subject at increasing
intensities until the subject first perceives pain, at which point his "pain
threshold" is reached. The intensity of the light and heat radiation used
to reach this threshold is then measured. "Ceiling pain" is determined
in the same manner. Degrees of pain are measured in terms of 'dols."
Zero dols represents the "pain threshold," reached when twenty-two
mc./ sec./ cm 2 of thermal radiation is used. Ten and one-half dols
represents "ceiling pain," which requires 68o mc./ sec./ cm2. The ex-
perimenters report consistent results with little deviation in "pain
threshold" found between persons or in the same person at different
times." 5
... Wasmuth, supra note i ,, at 16. See also, Wasmuth, Psychosomatic Disease and
the Law, 7 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 34 (1958).
"'"HARDY, WOLFF & GOODELL, PAIN SENSATIONS AND R-AcTIoNs (1952). The
dolorimeter is described at pages 67-8o and instructions for its use are given at pages
So-85. These persons have worked with the "pricking" pain threshold as opposed to
other thresholds ("burning," "aching-," "reaction") used by other investigators.
New devices are also being used for the alleviation of pain. See, for example,
Gardner, Suppression of Pain by Sound, 132 SCIENCE 32 (July 1960) (reported effective
in ninety per cent of 5,000 cases); Hardy, Wolff & Goodell, Electrical Anesthesia for
Major Surgery, 175 J.A.M.A. 599 (Feb. ,8, 196z) (it is reported a number of human
subjects have undergone electronarcosis without evidence of deleterious effects of any
kind). Dr.'s James G. White and W. H. Sweet successfully used a radio beam to
eliminate pain in terminal cancer cases. Address before the International Congress of
Neurological Surgery, z961.
For use of "machines" in other phases of medicine, see Ledley & Lusted, Reasoning
Foundations of Medical Diagnosis, 130 SCIENCE 9 (July 1959) ; Lusted, Medical Elec-
tronics, 25z N. ENG. J. MED. 580 (1gSS).
123 HARDY, WOLFF & GOODELL, op. cit. supra note z 14, at 88.
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The dolorimeter has been used mainly to test the pain-relieving
effects of drugs and in psychological and sociological experiments." 6 It
has also been used for clinical purposes. The patient is asked to com-
pare his own spontaneous, pathologically caused pain with that induced
by the dolorimeter. If the patient answers "about the same," and the
technician looks at his instruments and determines that the dolorimeter
has been giving the subject eight dols of pain, he concludes the spon-
taneous pain is also of an intensity of eight dols, etc. Hardy, Wolff
and Goodell say that although more accurate results are obtained by
measuring pain during its occurrence, good estimates can be made from
memory. "Thus... the intensity of a pain can be estimated within a
"dol" even after several weeks, although the subject underestimates the
intensity of a remembered pain as time goes on.""1  Conceivably, this
clinical use of the dolorimeter could be adapted to court room use.",,
Moreover, some physicians use the principle of comparison without a
dolorimeter to determine the intensity of pain. They pinch the skin
or biceps muscle of the patient with varying force and instruct the pa-
tient to compare his spontaneous pain with the pinch pain."9
The dolorimeter has been criticized on several counts. Dr. Beecher
points out that Hardy, Wolff and Goodell did their dolorimeter work
with themselves as subjects. Therefore, the sample was not adequate
and bias was not eliminated. 20 He concludes that a survey of the litera-
ture on the subject shows that the pain threshold is not constant,' and
that inconsistency is in accord with the anatomy of pain:
When one couples the anatomical possibilities for communication and spread
of impulses with the undoubted fact that determination of a pain threshold
requires judgment---i.e., comparison of the non-painful sensation with the
barely painful, and this involves memory-it is not difficult to understand
how the reaction component could be involved in perception. Pain per-
... Some of the data at notes 63-64 supra, was obtained through use of the dolo-
rimeter. Devices used in conjunction with it include a combination of a food scraper
and blood pressure measurement equipment.
"" HARDY, WOLFF & GOODELL, op. cit. supra note xx4, at x68.
128 It was stated in 1953 that dolorimeter experiments were "not sufficiently ad-
vanced to cite them as a scientific basis for proof of pain in court." Evaluating Pain
and Suffering in Personal Injury Suits, i CuR. MED. ATNYs. z, n.z (Sept. 1953).
""' BoNicA, op. cit. supra note 83, at 675.
"'o BEECHER MEASUREMENT OF SUBJECTIVE RESPONSES; QUANTITATIVE EFFECTS
oF DRUcs iz6 (1959).
121 Id. at 103.
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ception is greatly influenced by placebos, by emotion, by anxiety, to mention
three more powerful factors at random.=
Furthermore, much more emotion and anxiety are involved in accident
situations than in experimental pain situations. Consequently, it seems
that the entirely different reaction components in the two situations cast
doubt on the relevancy of dolorimeter data to pathological pain situa-
tions.123 Evidence that dolorimeter pain is different from spontaneous
pain is presented by dolorimeter studies of the pain threshold on areas
of normal skin on persons with skin disease. A wide spread of pain
threshold was found. Beecher concludes that the reaction component
was responsible for the wide range. That is, the subjects were very
much aware of their skin because of disease, and so they responded
emotionally to pain even on normal skin. 124  Likewise, an accident
victim views his pain emotionally.
From the above discussion, it can be concluded that we can measure
pain only under certain conditions and only for certain purposes. Much
of the experimental and clinical work is not germane to proving the
intensity of pathologically caused pain in a particular individual. Before
any such tests are admitted as evidence, it should be demonstrated that
they are relevant in proving the individual plaintiff's pain and suffering.
The results of such tests can be attacked on the grounds of improper
standardization, inadequate sample, bias on the part of the experi-
menters, and irrelevancy.
Many of the tests emphasize the pain element in pain and suffering.
It has been repeated throughout that the psyche plays a major role in
the appreciation of and response to pain sensation. The psyche largely
determines how much suffering is caused by the traumatic incident.
The point is that the psychologic factors must not be discounted in
attempts to overly objectivize the evaluation of pain and suffering.
For court room purposes, the answer must be that we cannot really
accurately measure pain. But we can demonstrate that the individual is
experiencing pain and approximately how much he is suffering from it.
The methods of proving this are discussed in the next section.
" Ittd. at Ixo.
13 Id. at to, x62. Beecher lists twenty-seven factors--race, sex, aging, etc.,r-
which should be controlled in pain threshold experiments before they can be considered





LEGAL PRooF OF PAIN
A. Expert Testimony
The above survey of ideas on pain experiences has developed them
as complex phenomena which cannot be explained without reference to
psychic factors. Depending upon the injuries involved, it may be
advantageous in certain cases for medical experts to explain the relevant
theories to the jury, since the jury must be made to understand that
protestation of pain where there is apparently little physical cause for
pain is not necessarily malingering.12 Studies tending to prove the
various theories should be admissible on the same basis as the theories
if they meet the test of relevancy and are shown to be valid and
reliable.
Expert testimony is admissible to prove future pain and suffering,
and is essential to recovery for such damages where the facts do not give
rise to an inference of future pain and suffering.1 28 However, future
pain and suffering is not a question of permanent injury which must be
corroborated by medical testimony where it is apparent from the nature
of the injury that the plaintiff will continue to suffer pain.'27 When
medical testimony is offered to prove future pain and suffering, it must
be phrased as "reasonably certain" in some courts 28 and as a "reasonable
probability" in others.12 Difficulty is sometimes encountered in eliciting
a statement with this requisite degree of certainty from medical wit-
... The importance of developing theories of psychogenic pain in some cases is dis.
cussed in Olender, The Amount of Pain and Suffering Endured by a Particular Human,
1961 TRIAL AND ToRT TRENs (Belli ed.).
""6 See Shawnee-Tecumseh Traction Co. v. Griggs, So Okla. 566, 567-691 151 Pac.
230, 231 (915).
"S"American Steel Foundries v. Sech, 69 Ind. App. 538, h2z N.E. 347 (1919);
Shawnee-Tecumseh Traction Co. v. Griggs, So Okla. 566, 567-69, 15! Pac. 230, 231
(x9S). See also Brown v. Campbell, 240 Mo. App. x82, 2i9 S.W.2d 661 (1949);
Schultz v. Pittsburgh, 370 Pa. 271, 279-8o, 88 A.zd 74, 79 (x952) (jury can assess
damages for a reasonable time). In a workmen's compensation case, it has been held
that the testimony of the defendant's medical witnesses who said that plaintiff was not
suffering from pain which disabled him, but instead was malingering, did not preclude
compensation. Apparently, the claimant did not offer opposing medical testimony on
this point. Great Western Sugar Co. v. Hewitt, 127 Neb. 790, 257 N.W. 61, 63 (934).
2
" See Annot., 81 A.L.R. 423, 439 (932)-
"" Id. at 449. Perhaps the difference is only semantic. "The common sense, expe-
rience, and conscience of the jury, if responsive, will guide it to the same end, whether
it is told that it must be reasonably certain of pain and suffering or satisfied that in al
probability or likelihood future pain and suffering will ensue." Coppinger v. Broderick,
37 Ariz. 473, 477, 295 Pac. 780, 781 (193!).
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nesses. Perhaps this is attributable to a tendency, by virtue of medical
training, to think in terms of more absolute certainty.180 Dr. Steindler
states the physician's problem:
The orthopedist on the stand is in the uncomfortable position between the two
contending factions. In observing strictest objectivity" he can never give
complete satisfaction to either of the parties, nor should he be expected to do
so. The question of whether pain exists should not be laid before him in an
absolute form because he is not competent to make an unequivocal statement.
The most that can be expected of him is to state whether on the ground of his
objective observations, pain as claimed is, or is not, compatible with the condi-
tion. This reduces the answer from a positive statement to the level of
possibility. 131
The mere possibility of pain and suffering, however, is not compensable.
The expert witness may express his opinion as to the genuineness of
plaintiff's complaints of pain. However, his opinion is not considered
conclusive evidence. 32 Of course, witnesses who are medical experts
often offer testimony that is more a narration of events than expert
opinion. Perhaps a psychiatrist would be the best witness where ma-
lingering is thought to be involved.8 '
B. Statements and Expressions of Pain
It is undisputed that the plaintiff may testify as to his pain and
suffering.' 8 4
... See Karlin, Medical Testimony-Problems in Presentation, zz W. Ras. L. Ray.
5, 6 (396o).
121 STEINDLER, op. cit. tutra note 98, at 19.
...Kirk v. Kansas City Terminal Ry., 27 S.W.zd 739, 744 (Mo. App. 1930);
Tycer v. Hartsell, x84 Ore. 310, 198 P.zd 263, 265 (1948); Gogo v. Continental
Casualty Co., io9 Utah 1z, 165 P.zd 882 (1946) (suit for disability on health and
accident policy); Olsen v. Weitz, 37 Wash. 2d 70, 221 P.2d 537 (395o). The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court in 1934 held inadmissible a physician's statement that the plain-
tiff suffered "the pain he complains of ... [because] pain being a subjective phenome-
non, only the person who experiences it is competent to testify as to its actuality." Litt-
man v. Bell Telephone Co., 305 Pa. 370, 172 Ad. 687, 692 (1934). Six years later,
a Pennsylvania Superior Court said the admission of a physician's testimony that plain-
tiff "suffered pain" was not inconsistent with the earlier case: "Here there was no
attempt to indicate the intensity of the sensation nor to corroborate testimony as to the
precise nature of the subjective phenomenon experienced, as was done in the case referred
to.", Lutz v. City of Scranton, 140 Pa. Super. 039, 145-46, 13 A.zd izz, 124 (940).
In Eickmann v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 363 Mo. 65x, 664, 253 S.W.2d 122; 130
(1952), it was said that "a properly qualified medical witness could better and more
accurately arrive at such a conclusion than a lay jury."
"" See Juliver, Psychiatric Opinions as to Credibility of Witnesses: A Suggested
Approach, 48 CALiF. L. REv. 648, 679-81 (396o).[" T]he injured person naturally was in the best position to tell whether he
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Statements of present pain made by a patient to a physician for
purpose of treatment are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule
on the theory that the patient will probably tell the truth since the
truth is necessary to proper treatment.135 That the statements are made
after commencement of the lawsuit does not detract from the com-
petency of the evidence, although it may affect its weight."' 6
Statements made by a patient to a physician not for the purpose of
obtaining treatment, but for the purpose of qualifying the physician to
testify as an expert, are generally inadmissible as hearsay or self-serving
declarations. 37 An exception to this rule has been recognized where the
complaints of pain are made in response to manipulations of the injured
areas by the examining physician. Such complaints, as opposed to mere
narrations, are regarded as part of the res gestae of the pain. 38  On the
same theory, even lay witnesses may testify to spontaneous exclamations
of pain.3 9 When, however, the manifestation of pain is more a state-
ment than a spontaneous exclamation, the testimony of lay witnesses
has been both received 140 and rejected.141 Necessity has been declared
a reason for admitting such evidence.142
The above principles deal with present pain and suffering. The
older cases held that statements as to past pain and suffering are in-
admissible even when made to a treating physician.4 Some recent cases
was suffering pain." Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 42 Cal.
App. 2d 669, 671, 109 P.2d 716, 718 (x9€4). And in a workmen's compensation case,
American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Florez, 327 S.W.zd 643 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959), it was said:
"It is recognized that the testimony of the injured party may outweigh that of medical
witnesses who are not confronted with the problem of living with the injured member
and who are generally not in as good a position as the injured party to evaluate the
severity and extent of his pain ... ." Id. at 648.
""
5La Fave v. Lemke, 3 Wis. 2d 502, 509, 89 N.W.2d 312, 316 (1958). The
admissibility of such statements had already been well-established at the time of Lord
Ellenborough. Aveson v. Kinnaird, 6 East. 188, 195, 102 Eng. Rep. 1258, 1261 (K.B.
18o5).
""Barber v. Merriam, 93 Mass. (i Allen) 322, 326 (1865).
""
7 Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Dixon, 207 F.zd 899, 903-04 (sth Cir. i953).
""' Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Dixon, 207 F.zd 899, 903-04 (Sth Cir. x953) i Steele
v. Stahelin, 234 Mich. 307, 207 N.W. 822 (1926).
""'Lassiter v. Poss, 85 Ga. App. 785, 790, 70 S.E.zd 411, 415 (1952) ; Collins-
Dietz-Morris Co. v. Richardson, 307 P.zd i59q, 162 (Okla. 1957). That the injured
person may not remember his pain was given as a reason for admitting this kind of
testimony in Kennard v. Burton, 25 Me. 39, 46 (184S).
140 Hamilton v. Doty, 65 N.M. 270, 273, 335 P.2d io67, 1070 (.959).
t Cross v. Blood, 22 111. App. 2d 496, x61 N.E.2d 349 (.959).
""
5 Hamilton v. Doty, 65 N.M. 270, 273, 335 P.2d io67, 1070 (1959).




have admitted such testimony.144 Rule 63(12)(b) of the Uniform
Rules of Evidence admits such statements unless the judge finds bad
faith. It would seem that they should be admitted on the same basis
as are statements of present pain made to a treating physician, for it is to
the patient's best interest to tell the truth.
C. Witnesses to Pain and Sufffring
Persons who observed the plaintiff's suffering may testify as to what
they saw.145  The cases often involve doctors'" and nurses, but it is not
necessarily as dolorologists or experts that they testify as to their obser-
vations. Instead, what qualifies them to testify to what they have seen
is the mere fact that they have seen it. The courts generally do not
bother to categorize the physician's testimony into expert opinion testi-
mony and mere observation of fact testimony.147  In cases involving a
nurse's testimony, it has often been expressed that the nurse is testifying
simply as a lay witness. 48
Since the nurse is often with the patient in some of his most painful
moments shortly after the accident, her testimony can be helpful in
establishing pain and suffering, as can that of ambulance attendants and
orderlies. A court which affirmed a 90,000 dollar judgment for the
death of a fourteen year old girl who had lived for four days after her
accident, three of them in a conscious state, reviewed some of the testi-
mony as follows:
According to the doctors and nurses who attended her, she endured the most
E.g., Peterson v. Richfield Plaza, Inc., z± Minn. 215, 89 N.W.zd 712 (1958).
148 "[The] blank statement that he was suffering was not enough .... "1 Lee v.
Swyden, 319 P.ad 1009, 1014 (Okla. 1957) (death action).
14" One writer suggests that a physician may consider questions on his patient's pain
as a reflection on his management of the case. Therefore, he suggests the pain question-
ing be prefaced with: "I suppose in this type of injury . . . there is normally a certain
amount of pain and discomfort, doctor?" CURAN, LAw AND MEDICINE 137-38
(1960).
... The objection was made in an old case that a conclusion was called for when a
physician was asked if the plaintiff suffered pain. The court ruled: "The objection
made was that the question called for a conclusion. If so, it was one competent for
an expert witness to give; but, while the fact might be more keenly appreciated by the
person suffering than by an onlooker, it was nevertheless a fact relative to which the
onlooker, and especially where he was a physician, might testify." Indianapolis & M.
Rapid Transit Co. v. Reeder, 37 Ind. App. 262, z64, 76 N.E. 8x6 (19o6). (Emphasis
added.)
E.g., Bimberg v. Northern Pac. Ry., 217 Minn. t87, 198, 14 N.W.2d 41o, 456,
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 752 (1944). "It does not require an expert to tell whether a




intense and excruciating pain. One of the nurses, who was with her con-
stantly on a twelve hour shift, said it was the worst case of burns she had ever
seen, and that she had attended many of them. She said that deceased's body
was badly swollen and that her face swelled until her eyes were closed and
she was still conscious and begging for something to be done to relieve the
pain; the nurse finally said that she was simply unable to describe the intensity
of the suffering. 149
Little imagination is required to evaluate the effectiveness of such testi-
mony. The reality of the suffering endured is brought vividly home by
descriptions of details such as changing a bed, bathing or even touching
the patient and the pain produced by these necessary activities. 150
The testimony of other witnesses to the suffering can be helpful. A
hospital roommate's detailed description of the patient's moaning, cry-
ing, and facial expressions, etc., was quoted at length in an opinion
affirming the trial court's judgment for the plaintiff.151 The spouse of
the patient, even though he may have had a beneficial interest in
the money recovery, has been permitted to relate the suffering he
witnessed. 52
The relation of the suffering may be permitted to involve tinges of
opinion, 5 s since even use of the word "suffering" conveys an opinion.
The reason given for allowing this semi-opinion testimony is that the
witness cannot exactly reproduce the voice, movements, and expressions
of suffering as he observed them. 4
D. Pain-Relievers
"Measurement of pain depends upon how much analgesic is required
to relieve the pain." 5 This principle has been recognized in many
"" Sandifer Oil Co. v. Dew, 22o Miss. 609, 624, 71 So. 2d 752, 755 (1954).
'g0 Smith v. Wichita Transp. Corp., 179 Kan. 8, 17-18, 293 P.2d 242, 249 (1956).
The nurse's testimony here was tinged with expertise in that she explained why traction
produces a "nerve-wracking" ' pain.
151 Mathis v. Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry., 6x N.M. 330, 333-34, 300 P.2d 482,
485-86 (x956).
.. Walter v. England, 133 Cal. App. 676, 689, 24 P.2d 930, 935 (1933)- In this
case the husband was often awakened at night by his wife's crying because of the pain in
her jaw. See also Benson v. Smith, 38 S.W.±d 749, 750 (Kan. City App. 193).
"' Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Green, 164 F.2d 5S, 63 (8th Cir. 1947) (workmen's
compensation).
..'Zogg v. O'Bryan, 314 Kan. 821, 8±8, 237 S.W.2d 5I, 515 (195). A year
later, the Kentucky court, after citing the Zogg case, held inadmissible a lay witness'
testimony that the plaintiff's arm pained her. Louisville Ry. v. Allen, 246 S.W.±d 443,
447 (Ky. .95±).




cases where the administration of pain relievers was considered signifi-
cant evidence of pain and suffering.156 It may, in some cases, be advan-
tageous to demonstrate the truth of this principle by referring to the
data produced by studies directed at testing and improving pain re-
lieving agents.
A group from Harvard has developed the following technique.
Pain-relieving drugs are tested on post-operative wound patients by using
a double-blind technique. That is, neither subject nor observer knows
whether the test agent or a placebo is being used at any given adminis-
tration. The patient is asked shortly after administration of an unknown
agent whether his pain is at least fifty per cent gone (the arbitrarily set
criterion for "relief"). It is reported that patients have no difficulty
making this determination. 157  It is contended that this method provides
a more valid means for measuring and understanding pain than do
experimental pain methods, such as the dolorimeter, for the psychic
elements are not eliminated from consideration. 5 9 Consequently, accu-
racy of results is cited as one of the prime virtues of this method. 60
Although the data produced is not relevant to proving pain and suffering
in a personal injury case, it is germane to demonstrating that analgesic
dosage is indicative of the degree of pain.
Hospital records may be used, in accordance with local practice, as
evidence of drugs used.16' Because of the pressure of too many duties,
the nurse's records may not accurately state the dosages given. Resort
should then be had to the order sheet from the hospital pharmacy
206 Hubbard v. Long Island R.R., 152 F. Supp. I, 2 (E.D.N.Y. 1957) ; Gorczyca
v. N.Y., N.H. & H. R.R., 14i Conn. 701, 704, io9 A.2d 589, 591 (x954); Ambrosius
Industries v. Adams, 293 S.W.2d 230, 238 (Ky. x956); Ferne v. Chadderton, 363 Pa.
x91, 199, 69 A.2d 104, 1o8 0949) (wrongful death and survival action); Green v.
Rudsenske, 32o S.W.id 228 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959). Conversely, a dissenting justice
has referred to lack of evidence of "so much as one dose of any type of medicine .. ."
as a reason for reducing an award. Texarkana Bus Co. v. Carter, 30! S.W.zd 300, 303
(Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
For a case where the accident and resulting injury and pain culminated in drug
addiction and alcoholism, see McBrearty v. Pennsylvania R.R., (unreported) S.D.N.Y.
No. 48-449, 1952), 9 NACCA L.J. 255 (1952). "Addiction to morphine has fre-
quently followed its prolonged use for the relief of pain." WOLFF & WOLF, PAIN 17
095).
... BEECHEP, op. cit. supra note 12o, at 46-47. Some researchers have had the
patient keep his own chart, while others have had observers keep records. Id. at 63-64.The dolorimeter is discussed at note x 14 supra.
'
0 9 BEECHER, op. cit. supra note 12o, at to.
... Id. at 54. In 1953, Dr. Bonica thought the dolorimeter more accurate, but the
Harvard method more practical. BON cA, ThE MANArEMENT Or PAIN x86-87 (1953).
101See, e.g., Hubbard v. Long Island R.R., x15 F. Supp. i, 2 (E.D.N.Y. 950).
(Vol. z962: 344
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which contains a record of the drugs ordered for the patient. It has been
observed that more detailed and accurate reports can be expected from
private duty nurses who often have more time to spend on details.1 62
Belli reports that he has been able to dramatize the significance of
drugs administered by having a pharmacologist testify to the effects of
the drugs given and by examining the pharmacist concerning the pre-
scriptions he has filled for the plaintiff during the period of illness. "'
Proper emphasis of the material facts of pain, such as analgesics adminis-
tered, focuses the jury's attention on the plaintiff's pain and suffering
and forces them to consider it as something more than a courtroom
concept.
E. Hospital Records
No attempt will be made here to launch into the vast area of law
on the admissibility of hospital records," 4 but reference should be made
in each case to the applicable local rules. Drug charts have been men-
tioned in the previous sub-section. It should be noted that sometimes a
physician's notation of "doing nicely" may be explained away on the
witness stand. For example, it may mean only that the patient's re-
covery is normal, and not that he is experiencing no pain. 6" Similarly,
it may appear from the nurses' records that the plaintiff did not com-
plain of pain, but it may be that the reason for "no complaints" was
heavy sedation."6
Generally, where admissible, the hospital record may be used as
evidence of observable facts, but not of opinions as to malingering.'67
Of course, the statement "suffering pain" is semi-opinion, but when
accompanied by reports of objective manifestations of pain such as drug
dosage and moaning, there should be no objection to its admissibility.
F. Demonstrations and Photographs
In judging the permissibility of court-room demonstrations of the
1.2 See Cantor, Reading Hospital Records, 1957 TRI. AND ToRT TRENDS 295, 305
(Belli ed.).
a 2 BELLI, MODERN TRiALs § 291, at 1627 (1954).
16' See generally Hospital Records, 6 PROOp or FACTS 131 (1960).
10" See Cantor, op. cit. supra note 62, at 306, 307.
'goKramer, Medical .4spects of Negligence Cases, PP.CrIcING LAW INSTITUTF,
TRIAL PRACTICE SERIES: NEGLIGENCE CASES 12 (1953).
1.7 Laundries, Inc. v. Goldberg, 7x Ga. App. 130, 137, 30 S.E.2d 349, 354 (1944);
Lewis v. Woodland, ot Ohio App. 442, 445, 14o N.E.2d 322, 325 (1955); Martinez
v. Williams, 312 S.W.zd 742, 749 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958). Contra, Allen v. St. Louis
Pub. Serv. Co., 365 Mo. 677, 285 S.W.2d 663 (1956).
r.F .374 VUAI LA W J(UILVL LVOL 1902: 344.
pain elicited by manipulation or movement of the injured member, the
question to be asked is: does the probative value of the exhibition out-
weigh its tendency to evoke the passion and sympathy of the jury?'"
Demonstration of a painful disability is a dangerous practice on plain-
tiff's part, for the courts are wary of simulation.69 On the other hand,
it is said that possibility of exaggeration should not go to competency
but only to credibility.170 Unplanned, spontaneous demonstrations of
the plaintiff's condition, such as a collapse in the court room, do not
require a mistrial. 171 In a novel opinion, the court cited the plaintiff's
tears as a basis for awarding pain and suffering damages:
The jury well could infer that though caused by mental anguish at the
memory of his pain and the increased loss of hearing, the physical act of
crying is painful and that it was reasonably certain to occur again in the
future. 72
Because of the importance of the visual and auditory senses in cases
involving demonstrations, deference is usually given to the discretion
of the trial court.173
On the theory that one picture is worth a thousand words, pictures
of the plaintiff which show the extent of his injuries after the accident
and which imply suffering are admissible. 4  Again, the test is probative
value weighed against prejudice, and the discretion of the trial judge
is usually upheld.7 5 Photographs of the plaintiff in traction'16 or wear-
ing a Thomas Collar' 77 have been admitted. In these cases, it is rea-
soned that the pictures make more understandable the extent of incon-
venience and suffering. Color photographs, as well as black and white
photographs, are admissible, but the fidelity of either type must be
168Lampa v. Hakola, xiz Ore. 6z6, 630, 55 P.2d 13, 15 (1936): "It would be
an exceedingly difficult task for the court to take away the impression upon the jury of
the expressions of pain made by the plaintiff. It is impossible to uncook a roasted apple.
We think the trial court acted well within its discretion in granting the motion for a
new trial."
l Peters v. Hockley, 152 Ore. 434, 53 P.zd z059 (936).
170 Arkansas River Packet Co. v. Hobbs, xo5 Tenn. 29, 58 S.W. 278 (1900).
17. Ismail v. New York, iS N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. 8959).
""Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Hartley, 16o F.zd iox9, 1020 ( 9 th Cir. 1947).
... Willoughby v. Zylstra, 5 Cal. App. 2d 297, 301, 42 P.2d 685, 687 (193S).
.'. Packard v. Moore, 9 Cal. 2d 571, 581, 71 P.2d 922, 927 (1937).
...West v. Morgan, 345 Pa. 61, 63, 27 A.2d 46, 47 (1942).
... Herndobler v. Goodwin, 310 Ill. App. 267, 273, 34 N.E.2d 8, 11 (194.); West
v. Morgan, 345 Pa. 6z, 63, 27 A.2d 46, 47 (1942).
""Lynch v. Baldwin, x 7 S.W.zd 273 (Mo. 1938).
• ]p -ft. ' y w'.t T Jr rlp 7 S' .. 1 "p 'l t IL T jlp
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established before they are admitted." 8 Because of the tendency of
some judges to consider color photographs inflammatory, it is good
practice to have black and white prints available also.
Although no reported cases have been found concerning the intro-
duction of motion pictures by the plaintiff to prove pain and suffering,
there was a workmen's compensation case in which the defendant intro-
duced motion pictures to show that the claimant was not disabled, but
the project back-fired. Instead, the court felt that the movies simply
demonstrated that the claimant did not have free use of his body. 79
Perhaps motion pictures would be preferable to live court room demon-
strations of disability and pain, since the producers could control their
productions to exclude prejudicial matter which could be grounds for
mistrial. However, this would have to be done with care to guard
against the charge of "rigging."
G. Special Problems in Survival Actions
Except for testimony from the one suffering pain, the same means
of proving pain and suffering are available in survival actions as in ordi-
nary personal injury actions. However, where the deceased died shortly
after the incident, special problems are presented. In order to justify
compensation for pain and suffering, it must be shown that the deceased
lived long enough to experience pain. 8 It may be that no one observed
the decedent in his dying moments. In such cases, circumstantial evi-
dence of conscious suffering has been sufficient. In an early Massa-
chusetts case, a general practitioner's opinion that the victim of asphyxia-
tion had undergone conscious suffering was held sufficient.1 81 His only
experience with the particular kind of asphyxiation was via reading.
Recovery was allowed for conscious pain and suffering in a recent
Arkansas case where the deceased was buried in a cave-in. 82 The cir-
cumstantial evidence upon which the award was based was the county
coroner's testimony that a man covered with dirt would live some three
17. See Roring v. Hoggard, 326 P.2d 812, 8t5 (Okla. t958); Scott, Medico-legal
Photography, i8 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 173 (1946).
""' Delery v. Scoggins, 13 So.2d 391, 392 (La. App. -943).
"" However, $x,ooo was allowed for deceased's pain and suffering and mental
anguish where he "was heard to cry out and to groan after the impact . . ." and he
died almost instantaneously. Beaty v. Buckeye Fabric Finishing Co., 179 F. Supp. 688
(E.D. Ark. 1959). "Although the court recognizes that excruciating pain and anguish
can be experienced in a very short space of time, it is clear in this case that a large
award for the benefit of the estate would not be justified." Id. at 695.
"'Finnegan v. Fall River Gas Works Co., 159 Mass. 311, 34 N.E. 523 (1893).
"' Erhart v. Hummonds, 334 S.W.2d 869 (Ark. 196o).
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or four minutes before being suffocated to death.183 That the time
element is small does not preclude recovery:
A person in great pain and suffering can live a veritable lifetime in but a brief
interval. A 2o-minute period of great pain and suffering is not to be shrugged
off as infinitesimal, too minute for the law to count or to care.
184
The courts have split as to whether death by drowning is instan-
taneous. In a recent case io,ooo dollars was awarded for the pain and
suffering of the deceased, who had drowned in a derailed train car.
"The decedent was presumably thrown around in the car prior to the
precipitation of the car into the river... .,,85 On the other hand, an
Oklahoma decision denied recovery for pain and suffering during a
drowning in a swimming pool where the deceased's body had been
lacerated by a pipe and "[T] hree physicians.., stated in substance that
the deceased suffered a great deal of pain and shock for at least three to
five minutes immediately prior to death." 88
IV.
AN EVALUATION OF PAIN AND SUFFERING
As AN ELEMENT OF DAMAGES
One conclusion should be made from this examination of the proof
and evaluation of legal pain and suffering. It is apparent that pain
and suffering are not amenable to precise measurement but there are
many ways to demonstrate approximately the interference with the tort-
feasor's victim's ability or potential to live a fairly normal life free from
pain and distress. It is submitted that this interference and the methods
for proving it, although imperfect, are nevertheless a sufficient basis for
awarding compensation.
The arguments against allowing compensation for pain and suffering
.8 Letter from J. L. Kidd, Little Rock, Arkansas, April 5, x96t.
""Miller v. Southern Pac. Co., 117 Cal. App. 2d 492, 509, 256 P.zd 603, 613
(x953) (FELA case in which a total award of $80,000 was given).
18. Meehan v. Central R.R., xSi F. Supp. 594, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 396o). The court
distinguished the Meehan facts from those in Beach v. City of St. Joseph, 39z Mich.
296, 158 N.W. 3o45 (1936), where deceased had been a passenger in an automobile
which fell into a stream. Recovery for pain and suffering had been denied although
"several witnesses heard cries after the accident, which indicated that the deceased
struggled in the water for a short time ... not more than three or four minutes." Id.
at 1046. The distinction made by the Meehan court was that Beach did not involve
"the preliminaries prior to the precipitation into the stream present in ... [Meehan]."
Meehan v. Central R.R., 181 F. Supp. 594, 626 (S.D. N.Y. 3960).
1" Fike v. Peters, 175 Okla., 334, 337, 52 P.2d 700, 703 (935).
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are forcefully presented by Professor Jaffee.'1 7  It is realized that dis-
cussion without detailed examination of the reasoning may do injustice
to his thesis, but it does not seem unfair to outline his thesis as it relates
to this discussion as follows:
(i) There is an "arbitrary indeterminateness of the evaluation [of pain and
suffering] ,188
(2) Pain and suffering is "an experience which involves no economic
loss . . . 3189
(3) Therefore, "[I]nsurance aside, it is doubtful justice seriously to embar-
rass a defendant, though negligent, by real economic loss in order to do honor
to plaintiff's experience of pain. And insurance present, it is doubtful that the
pooled social fund of savings should be charged with sums of indeterminate
amount when compensation performs no specific economic function."190
The premises should be conceded. But the defendant or the pooled
social fund of savings should compensate the victim for the changes
effected in his life. Prior to his accident, he had "X" capacity to live
a normal life free from the type of pain and distress he has experienced
and is expected to experience in the future. After the accident, his
ability to do this is only "X-Y." The victim has lost "Y" capacity to
live as he might have absent his post-traumatic syndrome. The only
question is this: should loss of "Y" be compensable?
The term "compensation" is used throughout the cases. The money
awarded cannot really compensate or be equivalent to lost of C'Y."1 Pain
and suffering is not like "loss of bargain;" on the contrary, it is unique,
but specific performance cannot be had for loss of "Y." Few would
argue that it is less valuable than possessions that can be bought and sold.
Rather, most would consider it more valuable even though its value is
not easily calculated in dollars. However, so long as money is con-
sidered a "good" by our society, money should be given the victim in
an attempt to counteract his loss of something good."' Otherwise, what
"' Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 219 (1953). His arguments are presented in more recent writings. See
GREEN, TAFiec VicraMs: TORT LAW AND INSURANCE (1958) (proposes compulsory
loss insurance to supplant negligence law in motor vehicle accident cases with the
elimination of pain and suffering as an element of damages); Morris, Liability for
Pain and Suffering, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 476 (1959).
'" Jaffe, supra note 187, at 224.
1SId. at 224. 190m. at 24-25.
... When compensation is given for pain and suffering in survival actions, it is diffi-
cult to apply the concept of lessened capacity. "The image of the law affording special
pocket money to sufferers for books, television sets, and other distractions from pain is
appealing-especially since it looks (abstractly) like no great burden. But the law of
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is the accident victim's quid pro quo? The pain sometimes associated
with the dentist's chair is compensated for by the arresting of an un-
healthy condition. The pain often accompanying childbirth is com-
pensated for by the life-proclaiming cry of the new son or daughter.
What compensation is there for the agony suffered by the tortfeasor's
innocent victim? The award of money is, at best, only an attempt at
compensation, but it is better than nothing. How much money is given,
of course, must depend upon the current attitude of society as repre-
sented by the jury or other fact-finder. 9 2
A Recommendation
The jury may be better guided in its deliberations by using more
comprehensive labels than "pain and suffering," "embarrassment," and
"distress" to represent non-pecuniary losses. Rather, physical and psychic
forces combine to present a total picture, and attempts to break down
non-pecuniary damages into these various elements are unrealistic. Even
where pain and suffering is the only element of non-pecuniary damages,
it does not connote everything that plaintiff should be compensated for.
What the jury is really asked to find when considering non-pecuniary
damages is: How much money should be given this plaintiff to compen-
sate him for the experiences he has had to go through and the changes
that have been made in his life as a result of this defendant's negligence?
This idea can best be conveyed by use of a label which describes the total
non-pecuniary effect of the accident on the plaintiff's life from the
moment of impact until his expected death. It is submitted that the
jury would be better advised as to what should be involved in assessing
non-pecuniary damages if a phrase such as "impairment of ability to live
a normal life free from pain and distress" were used.
damages for pain is not always calculated to provide only small diversions for sufferer.
Courts depart most dearly from that objective where statutes entitle a relative of a
mortally injured person to recover for the dead man's pain and suffering." Morris,
supra note 187, at 479. The quoted observation is most significant where no appre-
ciable time elapses between injury and death. Where death is not quite instantaneous,
it seems that allowing recovery for pain and suffering is really a disguised means of
punishing the defendant or giving money to the survivors to help compensate them for
their loss.
"" A proposal to limit pain and suffering damages to a percentage of special dam-
ages suggested in Plant, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 19 OHIo ST. L.J. 2oo, a1o-1
(z958), does not give sufficient weight to the important psychic factors of pain and
suffering. These may not be reflected in hospital bills, etc. The same criticism is
applicable to a schedule for pain and suffering comparable to those used in workmen's
compensation, as was proposed in Zelermyer, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 6 Sriu-
C:USE L. REV. 2hT 41-42 (.954).
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